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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
A  spirited  debate  explores  the  comparative  merits of  two  different  approaches  to the  enforcement  of
regulatory  law:  the  coercive  approach,  which  emphasizes  the  deterrence  of  noncompliance  through
inflexibly  imposed  sanctions,  and the cooperative  approach,  which  emphasizes  the  inducement  of  com-
pliance  through  flexibility  and  assistance.  Both  scholarly  and  policymaking  communities  are  interested
in  this  topic  of  enforcement  approach  within  the realms  of  finance,  tax  compliance,  occupational  safety,
food  and  drug  safety,  consumer  product  safety,  and  environmental  protection.  To  inform  this  debate,
our study  explores  enforcement  of environmental  protection  laws  where  the  debate  has  been  especially
spirited  yet  lacking  in  much  empirical  evidence.  Specifically  our study  empirically  analyzes  the  effects  of
these  two  approaches  on environmental  management  practices  linked  to  compliance  with  wastewater
discharge  limits  imposed  on chemical  manufacturing  facilities.  For  this  analysis,  we  view  the enforcement
approach  as  representing  a relationship  between  a regulator  and  a regulated  entity  that  is  measured  in
multiple dimensions  so  that we  are able  to explore  the  extent  of  cooperation  or  coercion.  The empirical
results  reveal  that a more  cooperative  relationship  induces  better  environmental  management.
©  2015 Elsevier  Inc.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
For years a spirited debate has explored the comparative mer-
its of two different approaches to the enforcement of regulatory
law: the coercive approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of
non-compliance through sanctions, and the cooperative approach,
which emphasizes the inducement of compliance through flexible
means such as compliance assistance designed to induce facil-
ities to address noncompliance pro-actively. Both scholarly and
policymaking communities are interested in these enforcement
approaches as applied to finance, tax compliance, occupational
safety, food and drug safety, consumer product safety, and envi-
ronmental protection (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). Debate over
environmental enforcement is especially significant in that com-
pliance assurance a contentious issue in the post-2000 EPA policy
agenda (EPA, 2000; Glicksman and Earnhart, 2007).
Under the coercive model, the deterrence of violations is the fun-
damental purpose of environmental enforcement (Markel, 2000,
2005; Mintz, 1995). The imposition of enforcement sanctions is the
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, University of Kansas, 435
Snow Hall, Lawrence, KS 66045, United States.
E-mail address: Earnhart@ku.edu (D.H. Earnhart).
most effective way to induce compliance with regulatory obliga-
tions. Under the cooperative model, enforcement focuses more on
compliance than deterrence based on the premise that regulated
facilities face incentives to comply other than enforcement threats
(Stoughton et al., 2001; Andreen, 2007). In this light, a coercive
approach may  even be counterproductive by engendering intran-
sigence and ill will from facilities.
Over the years, environmental enforcement in the United States
has shifted from traditional, deterrence-based enforcement toward
a more partnership-based, less adversarial approach that uses mul-
tiple tools to induce compliance (Stoughton et al., 2001). During
the 1990s, EPA adopted enforcement policies designed to provide
a more flexible approach to inducing regulatory compliance by
offering “compliance incentives” and “compliance assistance” to
regulated facilities (Andreen, 2007). Similarly, many states have
replaced aspects of traditional enforcement with some form of
cooperation (Andreen, 2007). However, no shift from a coercive to
a cooperative approach has been complete. Despite the dichotomy
between these approaches, agencies rarely rely exclusively on
one approach; studies of agency enforcement reveal that “most
enforcers use a flexible, hybrid strategy that includes elements of
both coercion and cooperation” (Rechtschaffen, 2004).
Despite the debate over enforcement approaches, relatively
little empirical research has compared the two approaches.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.02.003
0144-8188/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Specifically, few studies empirically test these competing theories
about how best to induce environmental compliance or spur reg-
ulated facilities to undertake better environmental management
that in turn should lead to environmental compliance.
This study addresses the paucity of empirical evidence by
examining the effects of the two enforcement approaches on
environmental management practices of chemical manufacturing
facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA). We  con-
ducted a survey of all chemical manufacturing facilities regulated
between 1999 and 2001. The responses indicate that, although
most regulated facilities describe their relationships with waste-
water regulators as generally either cooperative or coercive, these
facilities also regard some particular aspects of their relationships
as more consistent with one enforcement approach, while others
are more consistent with the other approach. Thus, the relationship
between regulator and facility involves multiple dimensions.
Empirical results indicate that a more cooperative enforcement
approach induces better environmental management. In other
words, as the relationship between the regulator and regulated
entity becomes more cooperative, the regulated entities improve
their environmental management.
2. Literature review
This section reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on the coercive and cooperative enforcement approaches
in the environmental realm.
2.1. Theoretical studies
The theoretical literature identifies two models of environmen-
tal enforcement: coercive and cooperative. The coercive model is
premised on the idea that regulated facilities’ principal motiva-
tions revolve around the maximization of expected benefits net of
costs (Malloy, 2003; Spence, 2001). Facilities comply only when the
costs of non-compliance, e.g., fines, outweigh the benefits of non-
compliance, e.g., avoided treatment costs (Vandenbergh, 2003).1
The coercive model proceeds on the premise that increasing the
certainty and severity of penalties deters non-compliance (Becker,
1968; Kagan et al., 2003). Thus, the essential task for enforcement
agencies is to make penalties high enough and the probability of
detection/enforcement great enough that it becomes economically
irrational for facilities to violate the law (Cohen, 2000).
In contrast, the cooperative model proceeds on the assumption
that businesses are influenced by a mix  of civic and societal motives.
This model postulates that businesses are generally inclined to
comply with laws (Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003). The coop-
erative model’s emphasis on compliance over the deterrence of
non-compliance alters the use of both inspections and enforcement
actions. Within the cooperative model, an inspection is designed
to facilitate compliance by providing advice to regulated facilities
(Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003), rather than to detect violations
and collect evidence for subsequent enforcement actions, as within
the coercive model. Similarly, the cooperative model’s emphasis
on compliance alters the use of enforcement. Regulated facilities
may  be afforded more opportunities to avoid sanctions by resolv-
ing non-compliance before enforcement is pursued than under the
coercive model, i.e., the cooperative approach “emphasizes flexible
or selective enforcement that takes into consideration the particu-
lar circumstances of an observed violation” (Scholz, 1984).
1 Costs of non-compliance include damage to the business’s reputation, potential
tort liability, and legal system expenses (Karpoff et al., 2005; Vandenbergh, 2003;
Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003).
As an important extension, if businesses are generally com-
mitted to compliance, sanctions may  prove counter-productive by
making regulated facilities resentful and less likely to cooperate
with regulators in the future (Burby and Paterson, 1993; Kagan
et al., 2003). In many contexts, random variations in facility opera-
tions or unexpected events may  occasionally cause noncompliance.
A coercive response to these events may  breed strong resentment
or ill will.
In essence, the cooperative model relies on flexible guidelines
rather than uniform rules, an emphasis on ex ante prevention of
violations rather than ex post sanctions for noncompliance, and
compliance assistance from regulators (Burby, 1995). This model
rests on the premise that regulated facilities should respond more
positively to regulators’ suggestions on how to achieve compliance
than to the threat of coercive sanctions (Rechtschaffen and Markell,
2003).
2.2. Empirical studies
Relatively few empirical studies analyze the use of cooperative
enforcement strategies. Harrison (1995) states that past studies
hailing the merits of cooperative enforcement lack empirical sup-
port. Even less research directly compares coercive and cooperative
strategies.2
Some studies analyze the efficacy of overall enforcement strate-
gies. Harrison (1995) analyzes the regulation of water pollution in
Canada. She finds that rates of compliance with water pollution
controls are significantly lower in the pulp and paper industry in
Canada, where the cooperative approach to enforcement predom-
inates, than in the United States. Burby (1995) examines states’
programs to reduce erosion and sedimentation pollution in urban
areas. He concludes that “[t]he best performing state programs
[for nonpoint sources of water pollution] tend to be those that
use a highly coercive approach”. Burby and Paterson (1993) exam-
ine whether the cooperative approach is better suited to inducing
compliance with performance standards than with specification (or
design) standards. They conclude that “a cooperative approach . . .
has much more impact on the degree of compliance attained for
performance standards than for specification standards.” Andreen
(2007) examines compliance rates for major dischargers under the
CWA, finding that compliance rates remained static during the
period in which many states replaced traditional enforcement with
some type of cooperative enforcement.
While these empirical studies help to inform our understanding
of enforcement strategies and their relative efficacy, only one study
gathers facility-specific data on the type of relationship between
regulators and regulated facilities and no study considers this
relationship as consisting of multiple dimensions. In contrast, the
present study examines both of these aspects.3
3. Empirical application
To examine the relative effects of coercive and cooperative
enforcement strategies, this study examines a specific element
relating to compliance with environmental protection regulations:
the frequency of wastewater-related self-audits implemented by
U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities whose wastewater dis-
charges were regulated by effluent limits imposed within the
2 According to Rechtschaffen (1998), “[t]he argument that cooperation works bet-
ter  than deterrence to achieve compliance with environmental law . . . is largely
untested”. Most of the evidence is anecdotal.
3 Notable studies explore specific cooperative approaches within a standard coer-
cive enforcement arrangement (Short and Toffel, 2010; Helland, 1998; Stretesky and
Gabriel, 2005; Toffel and Short, 2011).
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CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
between 1999 and 2001. By focusing on regulated facilities, our
analysis is able to focus on environmental audits that include an
assessment of compliance with the noted NPDES effluent limits.
We  choose the industrial sector of chemical and allied prod-
ucts as the focus of our study because it is an excellent vehicle
for examining the efficacy of enforcement strategies on regulated
facilities’ environmental management. First, EPA has demonstrated
a strong interest in this sector as evidenced by its study (joint
with the Chemical Manufacturing Association [CMA], which later
became the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) on the root causes
of this sector’s non-compliance (EPA, 1999) and its study on this
sector’s compliance history [Chemical Industry National Environ-
mental Baseline Report 1990–1994 (EPA 305-R-96-002)]. During
the study period, EPA regarded two chemical industrial sub-sectors,
industrial organics and chemical preparations, as priority indus-
trial sectors. Second, this sector is expected to display a wide scope
in the extent of facilities’ environmental management. Consistent
with this expectation, a substantial portion of the sampled facilities
never audit over the three-year sample period, while several audit
their operations at least monthly. Third, this sector is responsible
for a significant portion of the nation’s industrial output and a sig-
nificant portion of all wastewater discharges by facilities subject to
CWA regulation.4
Facilities may  control their wastewater discharges in various
ways. In general, facilities use end-of-pipe treatment technolo-
gies or proactive environmental management practices, such as
self-audits, which collectively may  constitute an environmental
management system (EMS). Examination of the latter is relevant
to policy development and trends in business management. Both
the EPA and state environmental agencies have encouraged the
adoption of environmental management systems by offering tech-
nical assistance, recognition, and regulatory benefits to facilities
that employ an environmental management system (Crow, 2000).
Similarly “business-led” initiatives have promoted participation in
trade association programs emphasizing environmental manage-
ment codes, such as the Responsible Care program of the American
Chemistry Council, or the adoption of international certification
standards for environmental management, such as the Interna-
tional Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 program.
Some empirical studies focus on the presence or absence of an
EMS  (e.g., Barla, 2007; Arimura et al., 2008). However, some of the
EMS  components may  not represent activities that effectively lead
to improved environmental performance (Barla, 2007). Rather than
examining the mere presence of a broad set of management activi-
ties or analyzing a count of practices, this study focuses on the use of
a particularly tangible management activity – environmental reg-
ulatory compliance audit – that is strongly expected to improve
performance. Previous empirical studies support this expectation
(Khanna and Widyawati, 2011; Short and Toffel, 2010; Toffel and
Short, 2011); in particular, Earnhart and Harrington (2014) reveal
that more audits lead to better compliance with wastewater dis-
charge limits. As important, since the mid-1980s, the EPA has
promoted self-audits as a tool for improving environmental perfor-
mance, especially environmental compliance (Evans et al., 2011). As
evidence of this promotion, the EPA has integrated environmental
auditing into its compliance and enforcement strategy; specifically,
it began in 1997 to include increased environmental auditing in
its strategic plan for improving compliance with environmental
regulations (Evans et al., 2011; EPA, 1997).
4 The chemical industry is not necessarily representative of all sectors. Indeed, its
attributes contribute to our study’s interest, e.g., some chemical firms are prompted
to  control their pollution through participation in the Responsible Care program, an
initiative supported by the American Chemistry Council.
A compliance audit represents a systematic, documented, and
objective review of a facility’s operations, which allows the facil-
ity to evaluate its compliance relative to audit criteria (American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 2003). The EPA defines
an environmental audit as “a systematic, documented, periodic
and objective review by regulated facilities of facility operations
and practices related to meeting environmental requirements”.5
Rather than examining the presence of an audit program, this
study focuses on the frequency of audits for three reasons. First,
most guidelines recommend that environmental self-audits be con-
ducted at least annually (Ebihara and Irminger, 2005). Thus, many
facilities may  conduct at least one audit per year. Second, reg-
ularly scheduled self-audits contribute to both stronger overall
environmental management and more consistent compliance with
relevant regulations (Wilson and Thomas, 1998). Thus, greater fre-
quency should lead to better environmental management. Third,
we wish to examine the extent of environmental management
adoption by measuring the frequency with which facilities audit.
The chosen sample and focus on environmental management
facilitates an effective analysis of chemical manufacturing facili-
ties’ responses to regulatory efforts to control wastewater-related
pollution. These efforts begin with the issuance of facility-specific
permits, which impose effluent limits. To ensure compliance with
these limits, the EPA and state agencies periodically inspect facili-
ties and take enforcement actions as needed. Inspections generally
represent the backbone of environmental agencies’ efforts to mon-
itor compliance and collect evidence for enforcement. As for
enforcement, agencies use a mixture of informal enforcement
actions (e.g., warning letters) and formal enforcement actions (e.g.,
administrative orders, fines).
4. Empirical framework and data collection
4.1. Framework
To assess the relative efficacy of the two enforcement
approaches, we  estimate the relationship between environmen-
tal management, as reflected in self-audits conducted by regulated
facilities, and the overall enforcement approach employed against
the sampled facilities, while controlling for other influential factors.
We construct a multi-dimensional measure of enforcement
approaches. For each dimension, we create a binary indicator
that identifies “cooperation” as opposed to “coercion”. The first
dimension captures the general relationship between the regu-
lator and the regulated facility: (1) generally cooperative or (2)
generally coercive. The second dimension captures the prevalence
of fair treatment of the facility by the regulator: (1) always fair,
(2) sometimes fair, or (3) always unfair. Environmental regula-
tion is commonly perceived by regulated entities as “unfair”; by
extension, inflexible enforcement of this regulation might also be
perceived as “unfair” (Zinn, 2002). More directly, an excessively
stringent deterrence-based approach may  be counterproductive
by engendering perceptions that enforcement is “unreasonable”
(Faure, 2012; Hawkins, 1984). In contrast, a flexible cooperative
enforcement approach should mitigate the perceived unfairness
and unreasonableness of regulation and enforcement directly. We
argue that “always fair” treatment reflects a more cooperative
approach, while less than “always fair” treatment reflects a more
coercive approach. The third dimension captures the stability of
the relationship as reflected in the assignment of regulatory agency
officials: the facility typically works (1) with the same individual
water regulatory official or (2) with multiple regulatory officials
5 “Interim Guidelines on Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,” 50 FR 46504
(November 8, 1985), Section II.A.
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that vary with circumstances. Typically, working with the same
official is more likely to facilitate a cooperative relationship, while
working with multiple officials is less likely to do so, i.e., more likely
to lead to a coercive relationship. The fourth dimension captures
the quality of the working relationship as reflected in a facility’s
decision to seek assistance from the regulator’s supervisor to help
resolve a difference of opinion between the facility and its regulator.
The absence of a request for assistance reveals a more cooperative
relationship, while the presence of a request reveals a more coer-
cive relationship. Similarly, the fifth dimension relates to whether
the facility seeks assistance from an elected official. Again, the
absence of a request reveals a more cooperative relationship, while
the presence of a request reveals a more coercive relationship. The
sixth dimension captures the physical proximity of the regulator as
reflected in the type of regulatory agency engaging the facility: (1)
regional EPA agency or (2) state agency. Closer proximity facilitates
a more cooperative relationship, while greater distance may  lead
to a more coercive relationship. The last dimension captures the
level of trust supported by the relationship as reflected in a facility’s
willingness to allow regulators access to plant operations if regula-
tors arrive unannounced. Greater trust reflects a more cooperative
relationship, while less trust reflects a more coercive relationship.
To measure the multi-dimensional enforcement approach, we
construct an index by summing across the indicators of coopera-
tion presence for each enforcement strategy dimension. This index
distinguishes strategies along a spectrum of coercion–cooperation.
The lowest point on the index reflects a strongly coercive strategy,
while the highest point reflects a strongly cooperative strategy.
Our empirical analysis then tests these hypotheses: under the
coercive model, greater coercion (lower index values) leads to
better environmental management. Under the cooperative model,
greater cooperation (higher index values) leads to better environ-
mental management.
The analysis controls for the influence of government interven-
tions – inspections and enforcement actions – in two dimensions.
The first dimension considers the ex ante general “threat” of receiv-
ing an intervention in the future based on the experiences of a
large number of facilities, while the second dimension considers
adjustments to this general threat based on the specific govern-
ment interventions taken against particular facilities in the recent
past (Cohen, 2000). To calculate the general threats, we count the
inspections or enforcement actions taken against all other chemi-
cal facilities in the same state (for state inspections) or EPA region
(for federal inspections and enforcement) and year, while distin-
guishing between major and minor facilities. Then we divide each
aggregate count by the number of other major or minor chemical
facilities operating in the specific state or EPA region and given year.
Facilities may  make adjustments to these general threats based
on their own experiences with recent interventions (Magat and
Viscusi, 1990). Consequently, we lag our measures by consider-
ing interventions from the preceding calendar year because audits
are recorded annually. Without this separation, some audits may
actually precede some interventions. The effects of specific gov-
ernment interventions targeted against particular facilities more
closely align with the effect of the regulator–regulated entity rela-
tionship so our study focuses more attention on specific adjustment
and less attention on the general threat.
The expected effects of government interventions on audit
frequency depend on the theoretical model. Under the coercive
model, both state and federal inspections should induce better
environmental behavior. However, under the cooperative model,
state inspections should induce better behavior, while federal
inspections may  induce worse behavior if the presence of fed-
eral inspectors is perceived as “heavy handed”. While under the
coercive model, enforcement should induce better behavior, under
the cooperative model, enforcement may  induce worse behavior
if enforcement is perceived as “heavy handed”. The hypotheses
derived from the cooperative model relate more strongly to specific
adjustment than to the general threat.6
Environmental management also depends on facility- and
firm-level characteristics: industrial sub-sector (organic chemical
indicator and inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals”
as benchmark), facility size as reflected in number of employees,
facility size based on NPDES classification (“major facility” indica-
tor, with “minor facility” as benchmark), facility age, facility’s years
of experience in the NPDES regulatory system, and firm owner-
ship structure (“publicly held” indicator, with “privately held” as
benchmark).
4.2. Data sources
We  gather information from various sources. Most impor-
tant, we  implemented a survey of regulated chemical facilities to
gather data on the nature of facilities’ relationships with waste-
water regulators, environmental management practices, especially
wastewater self-audits, and facility characteristics (e.g., age). We
also gathered publicly available data, including information on firm
ownership structure from the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),
Business and Company Resource Center, and Compustat/Research
Insight databases. We  collected data from the EPA Permit Com-
pliance System (PCS) database on each facility’s (1) location, (2)
major/minor classification, and (3) four-digit standard industrial
classification code. From the EPA PCS and Docket databases, we
gathered data on inspections and enforcement actions.
To implement our survey, we  first identified the population of
regulated facilities based on a full extract drawn from the EPA
PCS database as of September, 2001. We  identified 1003 currently
regulated facilities.7 Of those facilities contacted between April of
2002 and March of 2003, 267 facilities completed at least 90% of
the survey, implying a 27% response rate. This rate is comparable
to previous large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura
et al., 2008, 2011; Nakamura et al., 2001) and lies above the average
response rate of 21% as identified by a review of 183 studies based
on business surveys published in academic journals (Paxson, 1992).
[The online appendix addresses the possible concern of sample
selection bias.]
4.3. Summary of data
This subsection summarizes the dependent and primary inde-
pendent variables. Table 1a tabulates the distribution of self-audits
performed per year by a particular facility, which reveals that nearly
86% of the sample facilities conduct at least one audit per year.
As expected, the distinction between no audits and some audits
does not divide the sample strongly. The median facility performs
6 Other regulatory factors may  affect the extent of environmental management.
The  analysis attempts to control for other variation in regulatory pressure by includ-
ing EPA regional indicators as regressors. The use of these regional indicators is a
blunt tool for controlling for “un-measured” variation in monitoring and enforce-
ment across space. Inclusion of these indicators forces the analysis to identify the
effect of the overall enforcement approach based exclusively on intra-regional vari-
ation, which may  be insufficient for the task. Consequently, we reserve the inclusion
of  regional indicators as only a means for assessing the robustness of the empirical
results.
7 We applied the following criteria to facilities: (1) possessed an NPDES permit;
(2)  faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) were operating as of 2002,
and  (4) discharged pollutants into surface water bodies. We focus on facilities dis-
charging into surface waterways because facilities discharging into publicly owned
treatment systems, i.e., industrial users, face a distinctively different regulatory
regime.
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Table  1
Statistical summary.
Audit count N Pct Cumulative N Cumulative Pct
(a) Distribution of audit countsa
0 85 13.89 85 13.89
1  241 39.38 326 53.27
2  70 11.44 396 64.71
3  18 2.94 414 67.65
4  67 10.95 481 78.59
5  12 1.96 493 80.56
6  6 0.98 499 81.54
8  3 0.49 502 82.03
10  1 0.16 503 82.19
12  64 10.46 567 92.65
13  1 0.16 568 92.81
17  2 0.33 570 93.14
20  2 0.33 572 93.46
24  7 1.14 579 94.61
27  1 0.16 580 94.77
36  3 0.49 583 95.26
40  4 0.65 587 95.92
45  4 0.65 591 96.57
50  4 0.65 595 97.22
52  17 2.78 612 100.00
Variable Mean Std dev
(b) Means and standard deviations of regression variables
Dependent variable
Audit count 5.580 10.959
Primary explanatory variable
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index (count: 0–7) 5.990 1.046
Individual dimensions of regulator–regulated entity relationship
Generally cooperative (vs. generally coercive) 0.967 0.178
Always  fair treatment (vs. sometimes fair treatment) 0.810 0.392
Same  individual regulator (vs. multiple regulators) 0.582 0.494
No  request for assistance from regulator’s supervisor (vs. request) 0.791 0.407
No  request for assistance from elected official (vs. request) 0.946 0.226
State  is typical regulator (vs. federal) 0.994 0.040
Always  Likely to allow unannounced access (vs. likely/somewhat likely) 0.895 0.306
Control  factors
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other chemicals”)b 0.443 0.497
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other chemicals”)b 0.301 0.459
Major facility classification (vs. Minor Facility) 0.420 0.494
Facility  employees (count) 268.558 491.257
Age  of facility (years) 43.433 24.022
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) 18.727 8.387
Facility  owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held firm) 0.641 0.480
Preceding Calendar year state inspections (count) 0.784 1.499
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) 0.042 0.246
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.178 1.344
Annual  state inspections of others/# of other facilities (count/facility) 0.808 1.056
Annual  federal inspections of others/# of other facilities (count/facility) 0.035 0.056
Annual  enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities (count/facility) 0.115 0.312
EPA  region 1 (1,0)c 0.034 0.182
EPA  region 2 (1,0)c 0.085 0.279
EPA  region 3 (1,0)c 0.142 0.349
EPA  region 4 (1,0)c 0.263 0.441
EPA  region 5 (1,0)c 0.160 0.367
EPA  region 6 (1,0)c 0.204 0.403
EPA  region 7 (1,0)c 0.070 0.256
Dimension of relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(c) Correlations between individual dimensions of regulator–regulated entity relationshipd
(1) Likelihood of allowing regulator access to
plant without announcement: always likely
vs. not
(2) Typical type of regulator: state vs. federal 0.089
(0.162)
(3) Stability of interaction: same individual vs.
multiple individuals
0.021
(0.745)
0.106
(0.096)
(4) Treatment of regulated entity by regulator:
always fair treatment vs. not always fair
−0.055
(0.382)
0.070
(0.267)
0.224
(0.000)
(5) Overall relationship: cooperative vs.
coercive
−0.054
(0.388)
−0.015
(0.811)
0.099
(0.115)
0.345
(0.000)
(6) Requested assistance from regulator’s
supervisor: no vs. yes
0.015
(0.808)
−0.054
(0.394)
0.059
(0.350)
0.222
(0.000)
0.2222
(0.000)
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Table  1 (Continued )
Dimension of relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7) Requested assistance from elected official:
no vs. yes
0.055
(0.383)
−0.024
(0.709)
0.033
(0.602)
0.080
(0.205)
0.076
(0.227)
0.221
(0.000)
Index N Pct Cumulative N Cumulative Pct
(d) Distribution of regulator–regulated entity relationship indexe
2 1 0.47 1 0.47
3  4 1.86 5 2.33
4  16 7.44 21 9.77
5  38 17.67 59 27.44
6  73 33.95 132 61.40
7  83 38.60 215 100.00
a Based on sample used for estimation of year-specific equations.
b The analysis aggregates the four-digit SIC codes into three broader sectoral categories: organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals, and “other” chemicals. The broad category
of  organic chemicals includes the following four-digit SIC codes: 2821, 2823, 2824, 2843, 2865, 2869, 2891, and 2899. The broad category of inorganic chemicals includes the
following four-digit SIC codes: 2812, 2813, 2816, 2819, 2873, and 2874.
c Omitted category = EPA Regions 8 and 9.
d Based on full survey sample; p-values shown in parentheses.
e Based on sample used for between-group estimation.
a single audit per year. A majority of facilities (54%) conduct one to
three audits per year.8
Table 1b summarizes the dimensions reflecting a facility’s
relationship with its regulator. Only 3% of facilities regard their
relationship as “generally coercive,” while 97% regard it as “gener-
ally cooperative.” Moreover, 19% of facilities report that regulatory
treatment is “sometimes fair, sometimes unfair”, while 81% report
that it is “always fair”. No facility reports that its treatment is
“always unfair”. Table 1c also indicates that 58% of facilities typ-
ically work with the same regulator, while 42% typically work with
multiple regulators. Additionally, 79% of facilities did not seek help
from the supervisor of the regulator, while 21% did. Similarly, 95%
of facilities did not request assistance from an elected official, while
5% did. In addition, 99% of facilities report that they typically work
with state regulators, while only 1% report that they typically work
with federal regulators.9 Lastly, 90% of facilities are “always likely”
to allow regulators access to plant operations if regulators arrive
unannounced, while 9% are either “likely” or “somewhat likely” to
allow access, yet no facility is “not at all likely” to allow access.
Next, the analysis compares the responses to the individual
relationship-related questions by calculating Pearson pairwise cor-
relation coefficients between all possible pairs of relationship
elements; Table 1c reports these correlations. In general, these
statistics reveal only weak correlation between the various meas-
ures capturing the relationship between the regulator and the
regulated entity. Of the 21 pairwise correlations, only six are posi-
tive and statistically significantly different from zero (i.e., p ≤ 0.10).
Of these significantly positive correlations, the largest magnitude
is only 0.35, indicating limited connection between these pairs of
responses. As important, five of the correlations are actually nega-
tive though the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero.
The remaining 10 correlations are positive but insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero. This analysis demonstrates that the relationship
between a regulator and a regulated entity consists of multiple
dimensions. In other words, no single underlying dimension seems
to reflect all of the responses.
Based on this conclusion, the analysis calculates an index of
coercion–cooperation by summing across the seven dichotomous
8 Wastewater compliance is typically assessed monthly via submission of a
monthly discharge monitoring report (DMR) to a regulatory authority; 10 % of
facilities conduct self-audits monthly.
9 State regulators predominate because EPA has delegated NPDES permitting
authority to state environmental agencies in most states. As of 2006, only five states
had  not received authority to administer at least some aspect of the NPDES permit
program.
indicators of cooperation–coercion.10 Table 1d tabulates the dis-
tribution of this index. Nearly 39% of the facilities experience a
fully cooperative relationship with their regulators, while no facil-
ity experiences a fully coercive relationship. Only 2% of facilities
experience a relationship that is more coercive than cooperative
(index ≤ 3), with 7% facing a relationship that is a reasonably bal-
anced mix  of the two  (index = 4). Thus, the strongest variation in
the index lies at the upper reaches of cooperation (5 ≤ index ≤ 7).
As with many studies of environmental management relying on
surveys, of the 267 facilities who completed most of the survey,
only 215 provide complete information for our full analysis.
Table 1b provides a statistical summary of all the formulated
variables.
5. Estimation methods and results
5.1. Estimation methods
This subsection describes estimation methods used to examine
the link from enforcement approach to environmental manage-
ment while addressing important econometric considerations.
As one important econometric consideration, our primary
explanatory variable – enforcement approach – may be an endoge-
nous regressor. The validity of this concern over endogeneity varies
across the components included in the enforcement approach
index. On one end of the spectrum, certain components clearly rep-
resent decisions made by the regulator or facility, e.g., facilities’
requests for assistance from an elected official. On the other end,
certain components are most likely exogenously determined, e.g.,
primary type of regulator – state vs. federal – depends on whether
a state has primacy over the NPDES program within its borders.
We  assess this endogeneity concern by implementing tests of
exogeneity. For this implementation, we use three instruments
expected to affect the enforcement approach but not indepen-
dently affect facilities’ audit decisions: (1) time since the state
agency gained primacy to implement the NPDES program, (2)
two-year lagged state inspections, and (3) two-year lagged federal
inspections.11 Based on both partial F-test and Minimum Eigen-
value statistics, these instruments appear relevant. Based on both
10 If a facility is “always likely” to allow a regulator access to the facility’s oper-
ations, the relationship is deemed “cooperative”, otherwise, the relationship is
deemed “coercive”.
11 Anton et al. (2004) use additionally lagged measures of inspections in order
to  test the exogeneity of environmental management when environmental perfor-
mance is the dependent variable.
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Sargan and Basman Test of Overidentifying Restrictions statistics,
the instruments do not appear invalid. Most important, both Wu-
Hausman and Durban Test of Exogeneity statistics fail to reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity. (All of these conclusions are fully
robust to the time period analyzed and the regressor set used for
estimation.12 These conclusions are also fully robust to the use
of a single instrument – time since gaining primacy, which rep-
resents the strongest instrument from a theoretical perspective.
Specifically, after controlling for government interventions and the
overall enforcement approach, state primacy should not directly
affect facilities’ audit decisions.) Consequently, we do not employ
an instrumental variables estimator since the benefits seem out-
weighed by the costs of reduced efficiency in the estimates when
the regressors appear uncorrelated with the error process.
In addition, the dependent variable of audit frequency repre-
sents a sum of discrete events, i.e., count data. Accordingly, we
employ two pairs of count data estimators: Poisson and negative
binomial, each in standard form and zero inflated form (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1998).
The collected data measure environmental management over
multiple years (1999–2001) for each facility. To accommodate the
panel data structure, we employ two estimation approaches. The
first approach uses a between-group estimator, which collapses
the panel data into a single cross-section by calculating the sample
means for the dependent variable and all the independent variables
and then estimates the functional relationship based on the calcu-
lated mean values. The second approach considers each year of data
as a separate cross-section and estimates the functional relation-
ship for each year separately within a joint system of equations
that constructs a separate equation for each year. Joint estimation
of the three year-specific equations increases the efficiency of the
estimates by exploiting the correlation across the three equations’
error terms.13
The analysis considers three regressor sets. Model 1 excludes
the government intervention-related factors. Model 2 includes only
the specific adjustment factors. Model 3 includes both the spe-
cific adjustment and the general threat factors. By excluding the
government-related factors, Model 1 allows the estimated effects
of the overall enforcement strategy to absorb all of the influences
associated with any differential use of inspections and enforcement
actions. Moreover, the analysis considers two model sets: Model
Set A includes the regressors for between-group estimation, while
Model Set B includes the regressors for year-specific estimation.
Tables 2a and 2b reports the between-group estimates for Model
Set A (Models A1–A3). Tables 3a and 3b reports the year-specific
estimates for Model Set B (Models B1–B3). Tables 2a and 3a dis-
play the standard Poisson estimates; Tables 2b and 3b display the
standard negative binomial estimates.
The overdispersion tests shown in Tables 2b and 3b reveal that
the negative binomial estimates appear to dominate the Poisson
estimates. Still, we interpret both estimate sets as part of our
12 Depending on the time period and regressor set, the partial F-test p-values
lie between 0.0001 and 0.0069, the overidentifying restrictions test p-values lie
between 0.260 and 0.849, and the exogeneity test p-values lie between 0.154 and
0.492.
13 While the dependent variable – audit frequency – and most of the regres-
sors vary over the sample period (1999–2001), the measures capturing the overall
enforcement strategy do not vary over the sample period for a given facility. The sur-
vey questions generating these measures either explicitly or implicitly instruct the
respondents to consider the preceding three-year period as a whole. Due to this lack
of  variation over time, use of the between-group estimator seems the most appro-
priate estimation approach since this approach considers the three-year period as a
single cross section. Then again, the analysis may  reasonably assume that the meas-
ures of overall enforcement strategy sufficiently apply to each individual year as
well as they apply to the whole three-year period.
robustness assessment. Yet when these two estimate sets differ,
more weight should be given to the negative binomial estimates.
Finally, we  assess the zero inflated estimates. Vuong tests assess
whether the zero inflated form of a data count estimator dominates
the standard form. Test statistics reveal that the zero inflated form
dominates in the case of the Poisson estimator (p ≤ 0.006) but not in
the case of the negative binomial estimator (p ≥ 0.501). Given this
mixed message and extra complexity of the zero inflated form, we
assess the zero inflated estimates, without tabulation, only as part
of our robustness assessment, while focusing on the estimates for
the primary regressor.
5.2. Interpretation of effects not related to enforcement and
monitoring
This subsection interprets the effects not related to enforce-
ment and monitoring starting with the between-group estimates.
The following conclusions are robust across the three models and
between the Poisson and negative binomial estimates except as
noted. First, inorganic chemical manufacturing facilities audit less
frequently than “other” chemical manufacturing facilities. (Poisson
estimates of Model 3 also reveal that organic chemical manu-
facturing facilities audit less frequently than “other chemical”
manufacturing facilities.) Second, major facilities audit more fre-
quently than minor facilities (based on the Poisson estimates but
not the negative binomial estimates). Third, the shift from minor
class to major class prompts more audits, yet facilities with more
employees audit less frequently than facilities with fewer employ-
ees (in both cases, based on Poisson but not negative binomial
estimates). These results reveal economies or diseconomies of scale
with respect to environmental management depending on the
proxy of facility size. Fourth, older facilities audit more frequently
(but not based on negative binomial estimates of Models A2 and
A3). Fifth, more experienced facilities audit less frequently. Sixth,
facilities owned by publicly held firms audit less frequently than
facilities owned by privately held firms.
This assessment reveals that the Poisson estimation generates
more traction for the control factors yet both the Poisson and neg-
ative binomial estimates support conclusions that are generally
robust to the inclusion of the government intervention factors as
regressors.
As shown in Table 3, the year-specific estimates support iden-
tical conclusions in the case of the Poisson estimates and highly
similar conclusions in the case of the negative binomial estimates
(even then coefficient signs are identical except in four minor cases
where p ≥ 0.8).14
Although not tabulated, the Poisson zero inflated estimates sup-
port nearly identical conclusions and the negative binomial zero
inflated estimates support highly similar conclusions.
5.3. Interpretation of effects related to enforcement and
monitoring
This subsection interprets the effects of the overall enforcement
strategy on environmental management, along with the effects of
intervention-related factors. Both the Poisson and negative bino-
mial results strongly reveal that greater cooperation apparently
leads to more frequent audits. As shown in Table 3, this conclusion
14 Negative binomial between-group estimates prove statistically significant yet
the following year-specific estimates prove insignificant for the following factors:
years of experience with the NPDES system in 1999 (Model B1) and in 2001 (Model
B3), facility age in 2001 (Model B1), and firm ownership structure in 2001 (Models
B2  and B3). The opposite holds the following factors: facility age in 2000 (Model B3)
and number of facility employees in 2001 (Model B3).
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Table  2
Between-group estimation of audit counts: Model Set A.
Variablea Model A1 Model A2 Model A3
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
(a) Poisson between-group estimation
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.2239 0.000 0.2264 0.000 0.2148 0.000
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0682 0.314 −0.0876 0.199 −0.1500 0.031
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.7403 0.000 −0.6623 0.000 −0.7239 0.000
Major facility classification (vs. minor) 0.4960 0.000 0.5536 0.000 0.7556 0.000
Facility employees (count) −0.0002 0.018 −0.0003 0.002 −0.0004 0.000
Age  of facility (years) 0.0052 0.000 0.0044 0.000 0.0042 0.000
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0264 0.000 −0.0299 0.000 −0.0266 0.000
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.4798 0.000 −0.3407 0.000 −0.3509 0.000
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.0200 0.423 −0.0317 0.308
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −3.5875 0.000 −3.3506 0.000
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.1451 0.000 0.1388 0.000
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0784 0.061
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −4.5394 0.000
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.2132 0.196
LR  test of zero slopes (2) 302.6 0.000 391.9 0.000 419.5 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1004 0.1300 0.1391
Goodness of fit (2) 2169 0.000 2079 0.000 2052 0.000
Sample size 215 215 215
(b)  Negative binomial between-group estimation
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.2189 0.016 0.2177 0.018 0.2183 0.019
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0291 0.904 −0.0732 0.762 −0.2198 0.408
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.7972 0.003 −0.6978 0.011 −0.8052 0.005
Major facility classification (vs. Minor) 0.2732 0.163 0.2266 0.303 0.4596 0.125
Facility employees (count) −0.0002 0.375 −0.0003 0.246 −0.0003 0.140
Age  of facility (years) 0.0067 0.099 0.0056 0.166 0.0047 0.255
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0255 0.045 −0.0273 0.030 −0.0239 0.067
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.5127 0.021 −0.4210 0.062 −0.3954 0.082
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.1034 0.160 0.0729 0.498
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −2.5560 0.003 −2.6360 0.002
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.1321 0.278 0.1420 0.339
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0344 0.813
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −4.0640 0.144
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.1601 0.779
LR  test of zero slopes (2) 30.54 0.000 40.22 0.000 42.52 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0263 0.0346 0.0366
Overdispersion test (2) 1581 0.000 1501 0.000 1476 0.000
Sample size 215 215 215
a Each model also includes an intercept term.
is fully robust to the time period analyzed. Thus, greater cooper-
ation leads to more audits in each year of the sample period. As
important, this conclusion is fully robust to the choice of regressor
set. Thus, greater cooperation leads to better environmental man-
agement even when the analysis controls for the differential use
of inspections and enforcement actions and the threat of their use.
(The single exception is the negative binomial estimate of Model
B2 in 1999 where the p-value slips to 0.14). Lastly, this conclu-
sion is fully robust to the use of zero inflated Poisson and negative
binomial estimators.15
To complement this interpretation, we next interpret the effects
of intervention-related factors. We  first assess the between-group
estimation results, as shown in Table 2. The conclusions are robust
between the Poisson and negative binomial estimates unless noted.
The estimation results reveal that a greater use of federal inspec-
tions apparently prompts less frequent audits, as does the greater
threat of federal inspections (based on Poisson estimates), yet a
greater threat of state inspections appears to prompt more frequent
15 We also assess robustness by exploring whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of EPA regional indicators as regressors. Despite the inclusion of these
regressors, the effect of the cooperation–coercion index remains significant based
on  both the between-group and year-specific estimation results for both the Poisson
estimator and negative binomial estimator.
audits (based on Poisson estimates). These results are consistent
with the reported conclusion that greater cooperation prompts
more frequent audits. Perhaps federal inspections are more coer-
cive, undermining efforts to audit frequently. In contrast, state
inspectors are more cooperative, improving audit frequency. This
latter conclusion is somewhat weak as it is drawn from the threat
of state inspections rather than the differential use of such inspec-
tions. In contrast to the differential use of federal inspections, a
greater use of enforcement actions prompts more frequent audits
(based on Poisson estimates) perhaps because properly targeted
enforcement improves environmental management even though
enforcement may  be perceived as coercive. These conclusions are
fully robust to the choice of regressor set. These points notwith-
standing, the dominant negative binomial estimates identify only
a single significant effect: more federal inspections lead to less fre-
quent audits.
Moreover, conclusions depend on the time period analyzed as
shown in Table 3. Comparison of the between group and year-
specific Poisson estimates reveal these differences. First, greater
use of state inspections prompts more audits in 1999 but fewer
audits in 2001. Second, greater use of enforcement actions induces
fewer audits in 1999 but more audits in 2001. Third, a greater
threat of state inspections induces more audits in 2001 but not in
1999 or 2000. Fourth, a greater threat of enforcement induces more
audits in 1999 and 2000 but fewer audits in 2001. Comparison of
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Table  3
Joint estimation of year-specific equations for audit counts: Model Set B.
Variablea Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
(a) Joint Poisson estimation
Year 1999 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.1472 0.000 0.1503 0.000 0.1631 0.000
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0184 0.805 −0.0103 0.889 −0.0432 0.575
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.8817 0.000 −0.8507 0.000 −0.8581 0.000
Major  facility classification (vs. minor) 0.3863 0.000 0.3802 0.000 0.4470 0.000
Facility employees (count) −0.0003 0.004 −0.0003 0.004 −0.0004 0.002
Age  of facility (years) 0.0064 0.000 0.0057 0.000 0.0057 0.000
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0175 0.000 −0.0206 0.000 −0.0207 0.000
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.4347 0.000 −0.4244 0.000 −0.4209 0.000
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.0728 0.003 0.0701 0.025
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −2.4426 0.001 −2.5067 0.000
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) −0.0660 0.024 −0.0823 0.011
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0246 0.582
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −2.9774 0.050
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.3402 0.027
Year  2000 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.2273 0.000 0.2258 0.000 0.2239 0.000
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0135 0.843 −0.0060 0.930 −0.0460 0.510
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.6488 0.000 −0.6394 0.000 −0.6704 0.000
Major  facility classification (vs. minor) 0.4430 0.000 0.5092 0.000 0.5352 0.000
Facility employees (count) −0.0002 0.021 −0.0002 0.010 −0.0003 0.002
Age  of facility (years) 0.0054 0.000 0.0047 0.000 0.0050 0.000
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0297 0.000 −0.0298 0.000 −0.0297 0.000
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.5178 0.000 −0.4787 0.000 −0.4791 0.000
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) −0.0128 0.573 −0.0311 0.239
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −1.4908 0.000 −1.4408 0.000
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) −0.0001 0.999 −0.0162 0.759
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0579 0.147
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −1.5714 0.018
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.2605 0.104
Year  2001 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.2087 0.000 0.2108 0.000 0.1653 0.000
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0034 0.960 −0.0320 0.637 −0.0727 0.294
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.6274 0.000 −0.6033 0.000 −0.7065 0.000
Major  facility classification (vs. Minor) 0.4651 0.000 0.4159 0.000 0.8474 0.000
Facility employees (count) −0.0001 0.074 −0.0002 0.004 −0.0003 0.000
Age  of facility (years) 0.0046 0.000 0.0043 0.000 0.0022 0.061
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0250 0.000 −0.0264 0.000 −0.0194 0.000
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.3525 0.000 −0.2272 0.001 −0.2210 0.001
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) −0.0018 0.925 −0.0632 0.005
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −2.4120 0.000 −2.5118 0.000
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.1786 0.000 0.2091 0.000
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0700 0.052
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −7.2301 0.000
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities −1.4047 0.000
LR  test of zero slopes (2) 796.6 0.000 1006.6 0.000 1131.6 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0909 0.1149 0.1292
Goodness of fit (2) 6422 0.000 6212 0.000 6087 0.000
(b)  Joint negative binomial estimation
Year 1999 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.1640 0.096 0.1457 0.142 0.1723 0.088
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.0737 0.778 −0.1012 0.701 −0.2342 0.421
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.9367 0.001 −0.9965 0.000 −1.0635 0.000
Major  facility classification (vs. minor) 0.2206 0.294 0.1232 0.619 0.2652 0.436
Facility employees (count) −0.0004 0.142 −0.0003 0.161 −0.0004 0.119
Age  of facility (years) 0.0069 0.112 0.0063 0.145 0.0063 0.152
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0195 0.152 −0.0214 0.115 −0.0214 0.122
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.4483 0.052 −0.5057 0.028 −0.4931 0.033
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.1368 0.129 0.1684 0.134
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −2.2660 0.020 −2.3603 0.018
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) −0.1110 0.227 −0.1446 0.157
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities −0.0347 0.796
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −5.2178 0.283
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.6055 0.233
Year  2000 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.9927 0.020 0.2250 0.021 0.2363 0.016
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) 0.2233 0.922 0.0398 0.873 −0.0235 0.932
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.7234 0.009 −0.6776 0.015 −0.7148 0.014
Major  facility classification (vs. minor) 0.1968 0.331 0.2466 0.271 0.2242 0.466
Facility employees (count) −0.0002 0.344 −0.0002 0.331 −0.0003 0.261
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Table  3 (Continued)
Variablea Model B1 Model B2 Model B3
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
Age of facility (years) 0.0078 0.066 0.0067 0.116 0.0072 0.097
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0299 0.024 −0.0318 0.016 −0.0326 0.015
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.5118 0.022 −0.4633 0.044 −0.4455 0.052
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.0180 0.822 −0.0178 0.871
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −1.3722 0.020 −1.3281 0.025
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) −0.0056 0.983 −0.0735 0.788
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0617 0.651
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −1.0191 0.625
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities 0.4065 0.503
Year  2001 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index 0.2192 0.018 0.2387 0.010 0.2031 0.033
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) 0.0885 0.722 −0.0316 0.898 −0.1727 0.505
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”) −0.6451 0.018 −0.6283 0.025 −0.7435 0.009
Major facility classification (vs. minor) 0.2988 0.144 0.1456 0.497 0.5204 0.079
Facility employees (count) −0.0001 0.541 −0.0003 0.188 −0.0004 0.075
Age  of facility (years) 0.0061 0.145 0.0062 0.126 0.0034 0.416
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years) −0.0242 0.074 −0.0265 0.045 −0.0164 0.236
Facility owned by publicly-held firm (vs. privately-held) −0.3723 0.116 −0.2804 0.240 −0.2707 0.258
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count) 0.0540 0.353 −0.0137 0.864
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count) −0.6034 0.200 −0.6285 0.194
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count) 0.1779 0.028 0.2442 0.009
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities 0.0884 0.509
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities −5.4846 0.019
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities −1.8744 0.091
LR  test of zero slopes (2) 79.53 0.000 104.89 0.000 115.16 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0240 0.0316 0.0347
Overdispersion test (2) 4729 0.000 4544 0.000 4429 0.000
a Each model also includes a set of three year-specific intercept terms.
the between group and year-specific negative binomial estimates
reveals fewer differences. For years 1999 and 2000, no differences
appear. However, the 2001 estimates reveal differences similar
to the Poisson year-specific estimates: the greater threat of fed-
eral inspections and enforcement lowers audit frequency, yet the
greater use of enforcement increases audit frequency. In sum, varia-
tion across time indicates that the role of government interventions
depends on changing conditions.
Finally, the zero inflated estimates reveal highly similar patterns
especially in the case of between group estimates. As two  notable
exceptions, the statistical significance of the general threat of state
inspections slips to p = 0.12 in the Poison estimates and the signif-
icance of the differential use of federal inspections slips to p = 0.11
in the negative binomial estimates.
5.4. Further assessment of the robustness of conclusions
Our construction of the cooperation–coercion index is clearly
simple. As our last form of robustness, we explore alterna-
tive means of incorporating the multiple dimensions of the
regulator–regulated facility relationship. We  begin this exploration
by implementing exploratory factor analysis on the seven individ-
ual dimensions. This analysis identifies three factors with positive
eigenvalues as shown in Table 4a. The pattern of factor loadings
for these three identified factors is shown in Table 4b. These load-
ings reveal that five of the seven dimensions load most strongly on
Factor-1, while one dimension (primary regulator: state vs. federal)
loads most strongly on Factor-2 and another dimension (willing-
ness to allow unannounced access) loads most strongly on Factor-3.
Given these results, we  fashion two assessment paths. First, we
generate fitted values for Factor-1, Factor-2, and Factor-3 and use
these fitted factors in lieu of the cooperation–coercion index in our
estimation routines. Second, we construct an alternative index from
the five dimensions that load most strongly on Factor-1 and use
this alternative index in lieu of the initial index in our estimation
routines. We  also include the two remaining dimensions as two
separate regressors.
We  focus our assessment of robustness on the primary
regressor. Estimates generated by the first assessment path
fully support the conclusions reported above. The coefficient on
Factor-1 (ˇ1) proves significantly positive. (In the Poisson esti-
mates, p = 0.000 and ˇ1 ∈ [0.280,0.300]; in the negative binomial
Table 4
Factor analysis.
Factor Eigenvalue
(a) Eigenvalues
Factor-1 0.85247
Factor-2 0.24086
Factor-3 0.18367
Factor-4 −0.06041
Factor-5 −0.13842
Factor-6 −0.18025
Factor-7 −0.23073
Regulator–regulated entity
relationship dimension
Factor-1 Factor-2 Factor-3
(b) Factor loadings
Generally cooperative (vs. generally
coercive)
0.4886 −0.0225 −0.1140
Always fair treatment (vs. sometimes
fair treatment)
0.5489 0.1179 −0.0735
Same individual regulator (vs. multiple
regulators)
0.2778 0.2420 0.0028
No  request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs. request)
0.4151 −0.1956 0.1115
No  Request for assistance from elected
official (vs. request)
0.2451 −0.1982 0.2143
State is typical regulator (vs. federal) 0.0407 0.2884 0.1571
Always likely to allow unannounced
access (vs. likely/somewhat likely)
−0.0346 0.0850 0.2868
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estimates, p ∈ [0.055,0.067] and ˇ1 ∈ [0.264,0.272].) The coefficient
on Factor-2 does not prove statistically significant (p > 0.10). The
coefficient on Factor-3 (ˇ3) proves significantly positive in the
Poisson estimates (p = 0.008; ˇ3 ∈ [0.202,0.205]) but insignificantly
positive in the negative binomial estimates (p > 0.10). Thus, we con-
clude that, in general, greater cooperation leads to more frequent
audits, yet the type of primary regulator – state vs. federal – does
not matter, while the evidence of greater trust (greater willingness
to allow unannounced access) leading to more frequent audits is
not supported in our better estimates.
Estimates generated by the second assessment path also support
our original conclusions. The coefficient on the more narrow index
of cooperation–coercion (  ˇ > 0) proves significantly positive. (In
the Poisson estimates, p = 0.000 and  ˇ ∈ [0.232,0.242]; in the neg-
ative binomial estimates, p ∈ [0.023,0.028] and  ˇ ∈ [0.216,0.218].)
Yet the coefficients for type of primary regulator – state vs. fed-
eral – and trust (willingness to allow unannounced access) prove
statistically insignificant (p > 0.357). Again, greater cooperation, in
general, leads to more frequent audits.
6. Policy and research implications
The conclusions generated by the empirical results possess
policy and research implications. First, these conclusions imply
that environmental regulators seeking to induce better environ-
mental management practices should employ a more cooperative
approach, not a more coercive approach. Second, these conclusions
imply that future research on an environmental regulator’s enforce-
ment strategy should not view this strategy as unidimensional.
Instead, future research should view the enforcement strategy as
representing a relationship between a regulator and a regulated
entity and attempt to measure multiple dimensions of this rela-
tionship.
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